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A Reply to Revolutionary Subjectivity in Post-Marxist Thought:
The Case of Laclau and Badiou by Oliver Harrison
Mark Devenney1
Harrison’s article explores the continuing relevance of Marx and Marxism to so called
post-Marxist theorists, notably Laclau and Badiou, and with particular reference to
their accounts of revolutionary subjectivity. I have no quibble with his account of the
key elements of Marx’s account of revolutionary subjectivity – the centrality of
productive labour to the subjective realisation of revolutionary consciousness, and
how, for Marx, this is tied to objective tendencies immanent to the development of
capitalism. Harrison goes on to demonstrate that both Laclau and Badiou reject the
central components of this account: they do not believe that there are objective
tendencies immanent to capitalist development which necessitate a particular form of
revolutionary subjectivity; they do not think that history has a subject, and they refuse
the idea that society can be considered as an immanent totality. Despite this, Harrison
demonstrates that both authors draw upon the Marxist tradition in their accounts of
political subjectivity – Laclau on Gramsci and Badiou on Mao.
Harrison’s article marks an important intervention insisting on not rejecting
Marx, but on reading again and again Marx’s legacies, in light of critique. Indeed
Marx haunts the present, undermining its self-certainty in a variety of different forms.
These are not spectres to be exorcised, but legacies which have an affectivity in the
present. However, this work of remembrance, of working through, was not adequately
performed by those scholars influenced by Laclau’s work in particular. In this sense
Laclau’s acolytes have for the most part accepted his critique of Marx, without
rereading Marx in light of this critique. Harrison’s focus on revolutionary subjectivity
offers one route through this legacy. He is right to insist upon the continued relevance
of both Marx and Gramsci to Laclau’s account, while marking the distance that
Laclau takes from these accounts especially in relation to the idea that the proletariat
has either a privileged or a necessary relation to progressive politics. I want to say a
little more about this account, in relation to two key moments in Laclau’s work –
totality and equivalence.
Harrison notes that whilst Laclau rejects the idea that society could ever be a
fully constituted totality, now or in the future, he nonetheless accepts the ‘aspiration
for totality’ – totality understood as a horizon rather than as a ground. Why though
should we accept this so called aspiration for totality? On Laclau’s account it is
precisely this lack (in both the subject and the object, society) which drives repeated
acts of identification on the part of the subject. If however this ideal of a self-
constituting totality was always a fantasy, if it is in part a fantasy generated by the
theoretical presumptions of both structuralism and a certain version of Hegelian
idealism, why should the ghost of structure return in the guise of a desire which
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forever eludes our grasp? This assumption, so central to post-Marxist accounts of
subjectivity, allows ill thought out concepts of subjectivity to re-enter through the
back door, despite the awareness of their limitations. The more interesting question
would require an exploration of how a subjectivity reconciled to its own decentring
could engage in a revolutionary politics which refuses, a priori, the aspiration for
totality.
A second aspect of Laclau’s account noted by Harrison also requires
rethinking. Laclau insists that a counter hegemonic subjectivity is built through chains
of equivalence, and that these equivalential chains are secured through the emergence
of empty signifiers. This account is again all too familiar, and is now taken for granted
by most post-Marxist scholars. What is never noted is that it was Marx who first used
the term equivalence in relation to the money form. Money in fact functions as the
perfect empty signifier: rendered wholly independent of any physical form, money
allows for the exchange of equivalents in a manner which renders obsolete the
peculiarities of the production processes required for the consumption of commodities.
This fetishism of the commodity is central to any understanding of both the hegemony
of capital today, and the sundering of the particularities which may have resisted the
logics which go with the money form in its digitalised instantiation. Marx, however,
always returns to a universal which this universal equivalent ultimately presents, even
if unsuccessfully. The labour theory of value requires that we accept that abstract
labour is ultimately at the sources of all equivalent value. Leaving aside for a moment
the limits of Marx’s account, what this brief discussion indicates is the tendency of
post Marxist accounts to focus on forms of equivalence which require articulation by
a political subject, as opposed to more abstract logics, such as those of capital, which
seem to operate anonymously behind the backs of subjects, so to speak.
If Laclau’s account of the subject is limited in part by its unrequited reliance
upon the very forms of structuralism it rejects, what of Badiou? Harrison rightly notes
that Badiou does not consider the subject only in terms of failed acts of
subjectification. Instead, Badiou’s subjective truths relate to different truth procedures,
with their own particular logics, as well as to the surprise associated with the
emergence of a subject when demonstrating fidelity to an event. Moreover, Badiou
acknowledges the dangers associated with a politics of truth which cannot come to
terms with the unnameable of the situation – that which finally prevents any situation
from being at one with itself. The rejection of dogmatic fidelities here echoes Laclau’s
critique of the totalitarian possibilities of a politics of truth. Badiou though relies too
heavily on this account of the event, and thus of an account of political subjectivity
which seems miraculous in relation to an existent situation. If politics is reserved for
those moments when the very principle structuring a political order is put in to
question, then politics becomes a rare event, dissociated from the daily struggles to
change the worlds in which millions live.
It is here that Harrison makes his intervention, arguing that both Laclau and
Badiou go too far in rejecting Marx’s account of social production. He suggests that a
better path to follow might be that of Hardt and Negri, in particular their account of
immaterial labour which maintains a focus on the politics of reproduction while
outlining the possibility of a post-capitalist politics. However, these comments are all
too quick and do not take us much further than the conclusion that Laclau too quickly
dismisses – class –, while Badiou has no account of hegemony which might ground
political interventions. The real question concerns the transformation in the
production and reproduction of human life in the past three decades, through the
3Mark Devenney
financialisation of everyday life, and how this relates to the gradual evisceration of
social democratic politics so obvious today. Here we may well begin with Marx and
his account of equivalence. However, that would require another article.
